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Summary
Most discussion of information sharing in the war on terrorism has concentrated on the federal government. tle III) to data collection that is incident to the normal activities of LEA officers but that is divorced from any specific criminal case (typically handed "over the wall" 2 to the FBI for its continued pursuit and intelligence-building). These activities may occur collaboratively with other agencies. We also examine state and local LEA intelligence activity that might occur under federal supervision, such as through participation on a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) joint terrorism task force (JTTF). Although we describe many nonintelligence measures, perceptions, and activities in this report, we provide such reporting primarily for context.
We assess these developments in three major parts. First, we analyze data from a 2002 survey of law enforcement preparedness. Although major elements of that survey were analyzed in another report (Davis et al., 2004) , this report examines survey components that were previously not analyzed or were not analyzed in the context of intelligence. This portion of the report helps us determine the breadth, scale, and dimensionality of post-9/11 LEA counterterrorism intelligence activities.
Second, we conducted case studies of individual law enforcement agencies and their post-9/11 intelligence activities. Drawing on themes that emerged from the survey analysis, we
• assess in detail how eight LEAs around the country formed, managed, and oversaw their intelligence activities • describe the structure, tasking, and costs associated with their intelligence operations • review personnel and training issues associated with their programs ____________ (Davis et al., 2004) . The 2002 survey built on previous RAND work conducted in 1994 in the aftermath of the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 (Riley and Hoffman, 1995) . Both reports found high degrees of local variation in preparedness for terrorism and a correlation between agency size and likelihood of increased preparedness. Neither report examined intelligence issues in any detail.
For this report, we analyzed data from the 2002 survey through the prism of intelligence. We examined LEAs' prior experience with and perceptions of terrorism, the formation of specialized counterterrorism and intelligence units, LEAs' coordination of counterterrorism and intelligence activities, their information sharing practices, their terrorism threat assessment activities, and the counterterrorism and xii State and Local Intelligence in the War on Terrorism intelligence support needs that they identified. The survey was administered to a stratified, random sample of 209 local LEAs and all 50 state-level LEAs. There are nearly 18,000 LEAs across the United States, of which approximately 1,000 have 100 or more full-time sworn officers (BJS, 2002) .
State agencies generally report greater awareness of group operations and threats than local agencies do. Likewise, state entities have greater experience with incident management and response, incident investigations, and hoaxes. About 16 percent of local LEAs have specialized terrorism units, whereas 75 percent of states report having such units. Local LEA terror units typically have a more proscribed mission (primarily information-sharing); state LEA terror units are more likely to take on more expansive roles, such as training.
Most state and local LEAs have conducted terrorism threat assessments. Local LEAs were more likely to have conducted theirs after 9/11; about half of the states had done theirs prior to 9/11. There is a correlation between the size of LEAs and their threat assessment activity: the larger the local LEA, the more likely it is to have done a threat assessment.
About one-third of local LEAs collaborate with the FBI's JTTFs. The larger the local LEA, the more likely it will have participated in a JTTF. The local participation in JTTFs typically revolves around information sharing and receipt of training. Nearly all state LEAs collaborate with JTTFs for the same reasons-as well as for more expansive reasons, such as to assist with investigations. Most state LEAs and a near majority of local LEAs report needing more and better threat information. Most state LEAs and one-third of local LEAs report needing more manpower.
Generally, we can expect that the situation has changed, and perhaps improved dramatically, since the survey was fielded in late 2002. The field of intelligence is dynamic and fast-moving, and a survey conducted in 2002 cannot provide insight into the contemporary dimensions of the issue. The survey, however, did give us an idea of what types of issues to address through the cases studies. In addition, the survey points to the need to develop a mechanism that authorities could use to periodically assess the state of affairs with reSummary xiii spect to federal, state, and local cooperation on intelligence issues. There are multiple ways that such a scorecard could be prepared, such as through the administration of an annual or biannual survey, and multiple potential institutional hosts for the scorecard, including the FBI and the Director, National Intelligence. Regardless of the method and the institutional host, however, it seems prudent to begin to track progress on the issue more systematically. The 2002 survey should be considered a baseline against which future progress can be measured.
Case Studies
The case study section analysis was organized around six thematic areas, each of which parallels a topic addressed in the survey:
• intelligence mandate and guidelines • oversight • counterterrorism structure, tasks, and costs • personnel and training • information sources • communication within and among agencies.
Detailed interviews with local LEAs confirmed the survey finding that local police departments generally have not created separate units for the counterterrorism intelligence function. Counterterrorism intelligence gathering and analysis tend to occur as part of a larger criminal intelligence unit. Nor has the terrorist threat led to large-scale changes in the organizational structure of most local police departments.
In general, the mandate of the counterterrorism function is informal and set by the chain of command. Local police departments rely on federal guidelines in shaping their intelligence function, but the terrorist threat has raised awareness about what should and can be done in intelligence gathering, analysis, retention, and dissemination. In turn, some departments have adopted or refined their own guidelines.
Similarly, oversight of counterterrorism intelligence is provided internally through the chain of command in most agencies. Some jurisdictions have a degree of oversight by an external body-a civilian committee, for instance, approves the Los Angeles Police Department's undercover operations.
Local police have increased their commitment of human resources to counterterrorism efforts, usually at the expense of other policing areas. Most local departments have little capacity to analyze the information they collect or receive; although federal grants have been available, most of that money has been used for equipment and consequence management, not analysis and training. The 9/11 attacks led to a sharp increase in the amount of counterterrorism information that is shared within and among local police and their federal counterparts. Paradoxically, however, the sheer number of cooperating agencies sometimes inhibits progress in responding to the terrorist threat.
Oversight and Links to National Intelligence Activity
Overall, state and local intelligence gathering has increased, at least as measured by wiretaps by law enforcement for national security intelligence purposes. Not surprisingly, the jump was sharpest from 2000 to 2001. Since 2001, the number of orders has stayed roughly constant, but the number of communications intercepted under each order has gone up sharply, nearly tripling from 2000 to 2003. The interviews-with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, for instance-confirmed that if the local LEAs undertook terrorismrelated surveillance for intelligence purposes (as opposed to law enforcement), they almost always did so with federal officials through the JTTFs and with federal court oversight. This is probably close to the ideal division of labor. Federal authorities-the FBI in particular-will naturally lead in intelligence gathering that is not connected to criminal investigation. Local LEAs Summary xv have neither money nor capacity for that kind of pure intelligence. So their intelligence gathering would be guided by federal regulations and overseen primarily by federal courts.
Considerable attention has been paid to information sharing, especially from the federal level down-for instance by the national 9/11 Commission (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). Although technology remains a problem, policy is a more formidable obstacle. As both the surveys and case studies suggest, the principal information-sharing mechanism, the JTTF, is constrained because state and local participants are required to have security clearances at the level of their FBI counterparts. It is imperative to find new ways to share information and to share it more widely.
Finally, while an ideal division of labor would have more analysis done at the federal than at the local level, the paucity of local capacity was striking. Only the very largest police departments have any capacity at all. The importance of analysis derives directly from the nature of the counterterrorism task. A traditional law enforcement investigation seeks to reconstruct the single trail from crime back to perpetrator. In contrast, the counterterrorism investigation, especially one aimed at prevention, must look at a number of pathsassembling enough information about each to know when patterns are changing or something suspicious is afoot along one of them. The local role in the analytic labor would be to take the general guidance provided by federal authorities and relate it to local domain awareness.
Policy Implications
The survey revealed the extent to which LEAs are engaging in counterterrorism intelligence activity. The bulk of this activity is concentrated among larger departments. The case studies provided insight into how LEAs organize and support their counterterrorism activities. Here we found that departments are not generally engaged in massive reorganizations, but rather are typically paying for these activities
